What a course on philosophy of computing is not by Müller, Vincent C.
What a course on philosophy of computing is not* 
Vincent C. Müller 
American College of Thessaloniki 
1. Learning goals
This programmatic paper is trying to contribute to the development of an 
international course in the philosophy of computing, the main outlines of which 
were discussed at NA-CAP 2007 in Chicago (and at earlier CAP meetings). The 
chair of the 2007 panel, Piotr Bołtuć, invited the panelists saying: “The aim is to 
try to define some standards of what a good course in this would look like”, so I 
will try to contribute to this aim. 
A good course should include the interesting issues and anyone in the field 
can name many such issues, but why this thematic and pedagogical unity? Is
there anything that holds the course together? This seems the crucial question. It 
appears that the course cannot be called just “Computing and Philosophy” as the
CAP conference series and the associations because this title is chosen for its all-
inclusiveness of “something to do with both computing and philosophy”. 
Inclusiveness is useful for academic organizations and conferences, but in a 
course it needs to be avoided. We cannot present a ragbag of interesting issues, 
but neither can we go around and claim ownership of some established problems, 
perhaps after giving some of them new names. To put it positively, we must 
formulate the core of the course, the central learning goals, and then we can see 
what fits and what does not. 
Such learning goals are not already specified by saying that the course is 
“about the philosophy of computing”, not just because this is too vague, but 
primarily because it does not specify any philosophical problem. The idea that 
one can take any object, event or phenomenon x and then do a “philosophy of x” 
is one that gives philosophy a bad name. There is a good reason why there is a 
philosophy of physics, but hardly one of chemistry, why there is a philosophy of 
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history, but hardly one of archeology. The former have interesting and basic 
philosophical problems, problems that are urgent for the practitioners of these 
disciplines, the latter do not. If we want to do and teach a philosophy of 
computing, we need to specify such basic problems that are intellectually 
challenging and practically relevant. 
In the following, I shall take a look at some possible candidates that may 
provide unity – and essentially reject them all for being both too wide and too 
narrow. This should result in some controversy and thus in steps forward. The 
negative results also allow an indication where the positive result should be 
located. 
2. Not philosophy of computer science 
The obvious candidate for identification is the fairly well established field of 
philosophy of computer science – which depends on the large and wealthy 
mother discipline. This candidate is too narrow a specification for the course, 
however, because it is limited to computation in artifacts, in “computers”. This 
ignores a purely formal theory of computing as well as the important possibility 
of computing in natural processes. It is now common to think of the human mind 
as operating mechanically, even as operating as a computational mechanism; the 
view called “computationalism” which was the original myth of the cognitive 
sciences. (The history of which can now be read in Margaret Boden’s opus 
magnum (Boden 2006); see also my review (Müller 2008).) What is more, there are 
countless other natural (and even social) mechanisms that can usefully be 
regarded as computational. 
The candidate is also too wide because computer science includes a few 
problems that are irrelevant to this course, namely those to do with technical 
problems of the hardware – problems in electrical engineering, robotics, etc. 
Finally, it is far from clear that computer science really has interesting basic 
problems that are in need for philosophical analysis. In fact, “computer science” 
is a misnomer since the aim of the discipline is to make things, not to find out about 
the world. It is thus a proud member of the engineering disciplines, not of the 
sciences. This detail is often overlooked by all-encompassing representatives of 
the discipline, like Herb Simon, one of its founding fathers who used the 
characteristic title “Artificial Intelligence: an Empirical Science” (Simon 1995), 
arguing that the aim of AI is to find out what intelligence is. 
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Despite this rejection, I think we should keep in mind a few questions of this 
area that should feature in a course on Philosophy of Computing, for example: 
What is software? What is a computer program? 
3. Not theoretical computer science 
There is a theoretical area that may have been missed in the previous section: the 
purely theoretical study of computational structures and processes, often 
considered to be a branch of mathematics. 
It should be obvious that this candidate is too narrow, given that there is 
more to computing than formal structure. There is also a certain danger that it 
may be too wide, in its discussion of some purely formal subjects and methods 
that lead in to the wider areas of logic and mathematics. 
Having said that, this area is clearly rich in subjects that should feature in a 
course like ours, questions related to the formal description of computing and 
computing machines, the bounds of computability, the resources needed 
(complexity theory), program verification, data structures, etc.  
4. Not philosophy of information 
One other candidate with reasonably serious aspirations of complete coverage is 
the philosophy of information – after all, what is called “computer science” in 
English is often called the equivalent of “informatics” in other languages. 
Whether this proposal is too narrow is actually a difficult question because it 
would presume that we can say whether all computing deals with information. I 
tend to think that this is not the case, since some computing is purely syntactic; 
but clearly this is an open question. At any rate, we should not pretend that it has 
been answered – which is precisely what we would do if we were to limit our 
subject to the philosophy of information. 
The candidate is clearly too wide since not all information is digital, but even 
if we include non-digital information, not all information is processed 
computationally, or processed at all, for that matter. 
Again, this area is a rich source of relevant questions: Does computation 
compute over information or just over data? What is information and what is its 
dynamics? Is intelligence information processing, or could it be? Is nature 
somehow informational? – Of course, a rich source of programmatic material on 
these questions is (Floridi 2004). 
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5. Not philosophy of AI 
The philosophy of artificial intelligence is clearly a rich source of basic 
philosophical problems, but equally clearly it is narrower in scope than our 
course: there is more to computing than intelligence. This area is also too wide 
because many of its problems are not specific to computational intelligence, 
particularly those traditionally discussed in the philosophy of mind and 
cognition. 
The problems that we should take into account from this candidate are the 
classical ones concerning cognition, perception and intelligence in computational 
systems. Particularly important are, of course, the problems of representation or 
meaning in computers and perhaps the more recent questions whether an 
embodiment, a will and emotions are necessary for intelligence in computers. 
6. Not philosophy of technology 
One area that has been somewhat on the sidelines of philosophical debates within 
the strongly analytic traditions of the philosophy of computing is the embedding 
of computation in the wider context of human technologies. As in the philosophy 
of computer science, however, this area is too narrow, since it ignores 
computational systems that are not artifacts (e.g. formal, natural, social). 
That this candidate is too wide is evident, since it covers any kind of human 
technology, not just the computational ones. (And if we shall discover that 
everything is computing, the philosophy of computing would not become all of 
philosophy.) 
This area does, however, provide us with a very important set of questions, 
concerning human life with computers, especially human societies and 
computers. It also reminds us that there is the important issue of human ethical 
behavior with computers, what is known as “computing ethics.” (The idea of 
ethics for computers or other technical artifacts is just a misunderstanding, in my 
opinion.) 
7. Conclusion: The Core Curriculum 
We have seen that each of the above proposals was both too narrow and too 
wide. In a sense, this is good news, since it shows that the philosophy of 
computing is neither a sub-division of a traditional field nor a superset of already 
existing fields. It does thus stand a chance to carve out a field of its own. It seems 
essentially situated within the philosophies of information and technology, while 
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incorporating most of the philosophy of computer science and of AI; plus an 
appendix of applied ethics. 
On a positive note, I think that what we have seen so far can be captured 
fairly concisely to be about theoretical questions on the nature of computing, 
more practical questions of what that kind of mechanism is capable of and finally 
the ethical question. In his model course, Bill Rapaport suggested that “… an 
excellent course on the philosophy of computer science could consist solely of 
close readings of Turing’s two major essays: his 1936 paper on computability and 
his 1950 paper on whether computers can think“ (Rapaport 2005) I would agree, 
just that we would need to add a paper on ethics, something like Jim Moor’s 
“What is Computer Ethics?” (Moor 1985). 
Immanuel Kant famously defined philosophy to be about three questions: 
“What can I know? What should I do? What can I hope for?” (KrV, B833). I want 
to suggest that the three questions of our course on the philosophy of computing 
are: What is computing? What should we do with computing? What could 
computing do? 
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